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Judicial Independence in China: A Comparative Perspective
Abstract. As a general assumption, the presence of an independent, honest and competent judiciary in the so-
called rule-of-law countries benefi ts both the protection of citizens’ rights and economic growth. This essay aims 
to give a defi nition of the judicial independence principle in the People’s Republic of China. To this end the author 
describes the general understanding of the principle within the Western legal tradition, stressing the importance of 
different guarantees embraced within given societies. Due consideration is given to judicial tenure and the 
appointment and salaries of judges.
After an historical introduction this understanding is used as a yardstick to gauge the Chinese system. Not 
surprisingly, the Chinese judiciary cannot be yet considered independent, notwithstanding the undeniable progress 
made in the last decades. The subsequent explanation of the achievements of the Chinese judicial reforms are 
therefore instrumental in explaining that, in the Chinese context, it would be more appropriate to refer to judicial 
impartiality than to judicial independence. Without political reform, the Chinese judiciary will always be dependent 
on the legislative, in accordance with Chinese traditions and the country’s political structure. In conclusion, even if 
it is still not possible to use the term “judicial independence”, as understood in the West, judges’ professionalism 
appears to be a suitable tool for achieving a more reliable and impartial judiciary.
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I. The general understanding of judicial independence
The principle of judicial independence has shifted from being a feature of the separation of 
powers doctrine to become one of the characteristics of the rule-of-law concept. Even 
though this principle is now enshrined in modern constitutions and the international treaties 
on the establishment of international courts, it has never been fully defi ned without 
controversy. 
Notwithstanding the concrete diffi culties of fi nding a general defi nition able to cover 
different national and international legal experiences, Professor Keith Henderson, one of 
the leading Western experts on the subject, tried to encapsulate the main meaning of the 
principle in one of his comparative studies on this topic:
“[Judicial independence] means that judiciary and individual judges are relatively free 
from undue interference in the decision-making process and that justice is the norm, 
not the exception.”1 (emphasis added)
* Ph.D., Junior Researcher, Department of Criminal and Comparative Law, University of 
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1 Henderson, K. E.: Global Lessons and Best Practices: Corruption and Judicial Independence. 
In: Canivet, G. et al.: Independence, Accountability, and the Judiciary, London, 2006. 439 ff., at 445. 
Among his studies on the topic: Guidance for promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality 
(USAID/2002); The Rule of Law and Judicial Corruption in China: Half-Way Over the Great Wall 
(Transparency International’s Global Corruption Report/2007).
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The merit and, at the same time, the weakness of this defi nition is the inevitable 
presence of such vague qualifi cations as relatively and undue. It is possibly worth asking to 
what extent a judge should be free to take his own decisions according to law. And what 
should be considered undue interference? The answers to these questions will vary, 
dependent on different legal traditions in general and different countries in particular. 
Therefore, when talking about such principles, we need to specifi cally think about the scope 
of the principle itself, or in other words, about the function the judiciary should fulfi l within 
a given society. It is generally accepted that the function of the judiciary is to protect 
individual rights by striking a balance between public interest and collective rights. To this 
end, it is commonly assumed that an independent judiciary is therefore needed. Scholars, 
especially within the Western legal tradition, have so far focused their attention on how to 
reach such independence, which is considered intimately connected to the well-functioning 
of judicial decision-making and the court system as a whole.
Aware that the judicial independence principle stems from the Montesquieu separation 
of powers doctrine, it is not diffi cult to understand that “undue interference” can easily be 
exercised by state powers other from the judiciary, i.e. the legislative and the executive. 
Acceptance of the principle is refl ected in so-called “institutional or external independence”, 
meaning that members of the executive and legislative have a particular responsibility to 
refrain from giving instructions or seeking to infl uence the judiciary or the judicial process 
outside the procedural context where their intervention is provided for.2 Hamilton, one of the 
authors of the United States Constitution, wrote an article in 1788 based on Montesquieu’s 
refl ections, which was to become no. 78 of The Federalist Papers. This stated the following:
“For I agree, that “there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers.” And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can 
have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from 
its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such a union 
must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding a nominal 
and apparent separation; that as, from the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in 
continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or infl uenced by its co-ordinate 
branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its fi rmness and independence 
as permanency in offi ce, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an 
indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of 
the public justice and the public security.”3
In other words, a judiciary independent of the executive and legislative was seen as a 
precondition for liberty. Judicial independence seems to be considered more a principle in 
the interest of the community, allowing citizens to rely on justice and courts, than a privilege 
guaranteed in the interest of the judges themselves.4
2 Andenas, M.–Fairgrieve, D.: Judicial Independence and Accountability: National Traditions 
and International Standards. In: Canivet, G.–Andenas, M.–Fairgrieve, D. (eds): Judicial Independence 
and Accountability. London, 2006. 1–34, 23–24.
3 Available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm. Last accessed December 13, 2012.
4 Report to the Sub-Commission in 1985 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/18 and Add. 1–6.) as reported in 
the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers, E/CN.4/1995/39 
February 1995, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Judiciary/Pages/Annual.aspx. Last 
accessed December 13, 2012.
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Interference from other state powers is not the only way of compromising the role of 
the judiciary. Judicial independence has two aspects: external (or institutional independence) 
and internal (or functional independence). The former, as already partly pointed out, is 
meant to protect the judiciary from undue interference from other public bodies, while the 
latter refers mainly to the obligations of individual judges and the internal organisation of 
the court system as a whole.5
The main guarantees enshrined in Western systems to protect the judiciary from undue 
interference concern the system of appointing judges, their tenure and the conditions under 
which they work (including their salary and pension system).6 Selection practices can vary a 
lot. The civil law tradition is usually know for selecting judges by a competitive exam under 
a bureaucratic system open to young law graduates. The choice of becoming a judge is often 
a choice for life. Though different rules and conditions exist for career development, a civil 
law judge is usually young, selected as a civil servant on the basis of his/her ability and 
competence. In the common law world the situation is different, with no an immediate 
choice to head in this direction soon after graduating from university. In most cases, judges 
are selected from the best lawyers, with a position in the judiciary marking the apex of their 
careers. The choice may sometimes be a political choice, though different systems have 
developed different methods in an attempt to avoid arbitrary choices. For instance US federal 
judges are nominated by the US president “with the advice and consent” of the Senate.7
Nevertheless, a common point may be found in the fact that both the civil and common 
law traditions have deep roots as far as the legal profession is concerned. For instance, in 
England (where the common law tradition is rooted) attorneys started to be needed because 
of the growing complexity of the law in the XIV century. Since then, judges have been 
selected from among the best barristers. The common law approach is very much a practical 
one based on learning by doing and indeed the starting point of the legal and judicial 
profession involved young attorneys going to court and learning from older experts. By 
contrast, the civil law tradition, rooted in Roman law, goes back to the 11th century and the 
birth of the fi rst universities. Jurists were scholars fi rst, then law professionals (working 
practically with the law). 
Generally speaking, those century-old roots have generated a feeling of respect for 
lawyers and judges.8
5 Bartole, S.: Voce Indipendenza del giudice. Enciclopedia giuridica. vol. XVIII, Roma, 
1990. 1.
6 Andenas–Fairgrieve: Judicial Independence and Accountability: National Traditions and 
International Standards. op. cit. 8.
7 For a comparative analysis on the judiciary in Europe see Guarnieri, C.–Pederzoli, P.: The 
Power of Judges, a comparative study of Courts and Democracy (English editor C. A. Thomas). 
Oxford, 2002. 4 ff. As far as the US legal system is concerned see Article 3 of the US Constitution. 
The selection of judges in England changed recently. The Lord Chancellor, who used to be a member 
of the judiciary but also the Speaker of the House of Lords and who previously had sole responsibility 
for selecting judges, saw his role dramatically reduced in 2006. A more independent commission (the 
JAC) is now in charge of selection when vacancies arise, for more detail see the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005, art. 61.
8 History naturally teaches us that, at times, legal professions can be seen negatively. The most 
obvious example is the prejudice against French judges that led to an attempt to limit their creative 
role in interpreting the law (also for the future) by only allowing them to apply the law. An assumption 
inevitably dismissed in the coming years.
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Nevertheless, judges are expected to be impartial and, to that end, the Western legal 
tradition instituted a range of guarantees able to make them feel independent. Security of 
tenure for example means that neither their place of work nor their functions can be changed 
without their approval. Life tenure is therefore one of the most important features of 
Western judiciaries. Clearly established in the Act of Settlement for English judges in 1701, 
it remains a fundamental principle. In addition to establishing that judges can keep their 
positions “quamdiu se bene gesserint” (as long as they behave properly) the same Act goes 
on to stipulate that they should be well paid.9 Security of tenure or fi xed terms of offi ce of 
suffi cient duration help guarantee personal independence. Similarly, pensions and salary 
levels play a decisive role with regard to dignity and resistance to corruption.10
More recently, global experience seems to show that an independent judiciary also 
plays a key role in establishing the rule of law,11 protecting human and civil rights (property 
rights in particular), and correspondingly promoting economic growth.
It has always been assumed that the right to a fair trial is a core principle in a so-called 
rule of law countries, with an independent judge being considered the best guarantee for a 
fair trial, as independence is apparently perceived as a prerequisite for an impartial decision. 
Is this really the case?
Coming back to Keith Henderson’s ideas, it could be of interest to point out that his 
defi nition of the judicial independence principle continues by saying that “Impartiality with 
the justice system is the end goal”.12 Though judicial impartiality is linked with 
independence, it is still something different. Historical events in the West contributed to 
shaping the idea that an independent body is more likely to be impartial, but a contrario a 
dependent body it is not necessarily partial.
II. Judicial Independence in China
Though common ground can be found when developing judicial independence theories, it 
is obviously dominated by Western doctrine. It is therefore interesting to look at the 
development of the principle of judicial independence in China, where the legal culture has 
developed in a quite different way.
  9 The same principles can again be found in Article 3 of the US Constitution. This states that 
“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offi ces during good Behavior, 
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Offi ce”, as in many other Western countries.
10 There are several international legal documents dealing with this topic. These include: The 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950); UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary (1985); Syracuse Principles (1981); Universal Charter of the Judge (1999); Beijing 
Principles (1995), The International Bar Association Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence 
(1982), etc.
11 Bingham, T.: The Rule of Law. London, 2010. 85.
12 Henderson: Global Lessons and Best Practices: Corruption and Judicial Independence. op. 
cit. 445.
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1. Judicial function in traditional China
Considering that the Chinese Empire collapsed in 1911, it is necessary to take into account 
the fact that the separation of powers doctrine was never seen as a feature of the Chinese 
legal system.13 In fact, ever since the Chinese Empire became a centralised Empire (Qin 
Dynasty 221 B.C.) it has been characterised by the absence of a clear distinction between 
judicial and administrative functions. Put in other words, the system was run by the 
Emperor, with the different administrative levels in the hands of Imperial magistrates, who, 
despite their name, had several functions, one of which was being responsible for the 
decision-making process. In smaller clans or groups of people this was a function exercised 
by old and wiser persons. Communities were divided into smaller groups ranging from a 
family to a wider clan, with a village as the basic unit. Individuals were only important in 
the context of a group.14
When referring to Chinese traditional law, scholars are accustomed to talk about two 
elements, namely the li (礼) and the fa (法). The Chinese character li is usually translated as 
a “rite”, in reference to Confucian orthodoxy according to which social order and harmony 
are achieved through polite secular and religious behaviour. The validity of the li as a 
behavioural rule is to be found in certain broad moral principles intrinsically embodied in 
the rites. In a narrower sense “[li] denotes the correct performance of all kinds of religious 
ritual: sacrifi cing to the ancestors at the right time and place and with the proper deportment 
and attitude is li”.15 If the rites represent the material side of moral and virtuous principles, 
a lack of respect for these rites entails a lack of respect for the rule of virtue, possibly 
bringing about social disorder. As a consequence the fa, the written laws, are necessary to 
stop disrespectful behavior.
“Lead the people by regulations, keep them in order by punishment, and they will fl ee 
from you and lose all self-respect. But lead them by virtue and keep them in order by 
established morality (li), and they will keep their self-respect and come to you.”16
In other words, repressive laws were considered “a necessary evil” to maintain social 
order and harmony.17 Interestingly, this conception of socio-legal order was the result of 
two different schools of thought, with the rites stemming from Confucian ideology, while 
the fa is derived from the former and antagonistic Legalist school of thought.18 
By and large, the Confucian concept of li is based on a highly hierarchical society, 
with different behaviour patterns prescribed dependent on the age or rank of an individual 
13 In 1912 Sun Yat Sen attempted to modernise the country in line with Western principles, 
bringing the Montesquieu doctrine into the Chinese context. However, his efforts never fully 
penetrated the Chinese context.
14 MacCormack, G.: The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law. Athens–London, 1996.
15 Bodde, D.: Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Thought 
in Traditional China. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 107 (1963) 5, 375–398, 
 382–383.
16 Ibid. 384.
17 Ibid. 382.
18 Ibid. 382.
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within his/her family or his/her role within society.19 This means that the hierarchical 
structure results not only in different behavior patterns but also in different privileges, i.e. 
each individual had different rights and duties depending on his/her role, meaning that fa 
should be equally applied to all people infringing the prescribed rules. By the time li and fa 
became the main features of traditional Chinese law (the values of li had been incorporated 
into the written fa), “[…] the ordinary man’s awareness and acceptance of such norms was 
shaped far more by the pervasive infl uence of custom than by any formally enacted system 
of law”.20 The relationship between those two elements resulted in the so-called 
“confucianisation of the law”,21 with the spirit and sometimes the actual provisions of the 
Confucian li being incorporated into Imperial legislation. This process allowed the rules 
prescribed by li to attain offi cial status in the form of positive law. On the whole, traditional 
Chinese law was imbued with Confucian values, not only visible in written law, but in 
every corner of the administration and Chinese society. For instance, the value of moral 
Confucian principles was considered so important that the imperial examination for 
recruiting Imperial administrators was based on the study of Confucian texts, i.e. the civil 
service examination system used during the Empire to select government personnel used 
intellect rather than birth as a yardstick.22 This in turn allowed an impartial administration 
(and therefore judicial administration), even if it was under the strict rule of the Emperor. 
By and large, the Emperor was in charge of maintaining harmony within the country in 
accordance with Confucian orthodoxy. The Chinese character 王 (wang) makes this concept 
even clearer: the three horizontal strokes represent the Heaven (the highest stroke), mankind 
(the stroke in the middle), and the earth (the stroke at the bottom), while the king/Emperor 
is represented by the vertical stroke, maintaining balance between the three aforementioned 
components.23 
In order to maintain such a balance throughout the Empire, wang was used to select, 
through the very diffi cult imperial examinations, magistrates based on merit and the study 
of Confucian texts. Generally speaking, law developed as a way of maintaining social order 
and not to protect and defi ne people’s rights against another individual or group. Protection 
against state acts was not even considered.24 
The impartiality of imperial magistrates was therefore important, and their wisdom 
guaranteed their impartiality.
2. The fi rst appearance of judicial independence: From Sun Yat-Sen to Mao Zedong
A different concept of the administration of justice found its way into China on the arrival 
of the Western powers in the mid-19th century. Historical events in the Opium Wars period 
(1839–1842 and 1856–1860) led to a collision of Chinese culture with the legal principles 
19 “The fi ve major relationships of Confucianism–father and son, ruler and subject, husband and 
wife, elder and younger brother, friend and friend–are instinctive to man and essential for a stable 
social order.” Ibid. 383–384.
20 Ibid. 376.
21 Ibid. 386.
22 Ibid. 387.
23 Szto, M.: Strengthening the Rule of Virtue and Finding Chinese Law in “Other” Places: 
Gods, Kin, Guilds, and Gifts. Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 35 (2012) 1, 1 ff. 7.
24 Bodde: ibid. 375–398, 375.
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of the Western powers. The Opium Wars were ended by the so-called “Unequal Treaties” 
with their extraterritoriality clauses such as the following one found in the Chinese-
American treaty signed at Wang-hea in 1844:
“Subjects of China who may be guilty of any criminal act towards citizens of the Uni-
ted States shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the 
laws of China, and citizens of the United States who may commit any crime in China 
shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the Consul or other public functionary 
of the United States authorized according to the laws of the United States; and in order 
to the prevention of all controversy and dissatisfaction justice shall be equitably and 
impartially administered on both sides.”25
The same applied to any infringement of property or personal rights when one of the 
parties was a United States citizen. 26 
This all showed that the Chinese administration of justice was considered inadequate 
and weak, if not non-existent, and for this reason needed to be aligned with the Western 
systems. These were the conditions under which the judicial independence principles (司法
独立 sifaduli) entered the Chinese legal system.
The Unequal Treaties and their extraterritoriality clauses were maintained until the end 
of the Second World War even though, in the aftermath of the fall of the Empire (1912), the 
last Qing Emperor and the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) changed their approach and 
started looking at the different legal solutions used in the different Western countries with 
the aim of transplanting into China the ones best suited for modernising the traditional 
Chinese legal system.27 The major efforts started before the collapse of the Empire and 
continued under the Republic of China founded by Sun Yat-Sen in 1912 saw Chinese 
scholars being sent to the West to study Western laws and constitutions. These resulted in a 
certain amount of progress within the country. Indeed, it was under the leadership of Sun 
Yat-Sen that the separation of powers doctrine was taken over from Europe and the U.S. 
and adapted to the Chinese context. Nevertheless, this principle along with other Western 
laws never really gained a fi rm footing within Chinese society. The efforts of the 
Kuomintang, founded in 1926 by Sun but led by his successor Chiang-Kai-Shek, continued, 
taking a much more worthwhile path in Taiwan where the Nationalists took refuge after the 
Communist rise. However, even though the so-called “six laws”,28 based mainly on German 
law, were elaborated as effective legal documents or drafts (that never came into force), 
25 Denby, C: Extraterritoriality in China. American Journal of International Law, 18 (1924) 4, 
670–671.
26 Ibid. 671.
27 A Commission for Legal Reform was established in 1903. Among its members Shen Jiaben 
was considered a leading expert in Western law. For a general introduction of the topic, see Choi, C.: 
East Asia Encounters with Western Law and the Emergence of East Asian Jurisprudence. In: Tomasek, 
M.–Muhlemann, G. (eds): Interpretation of Law in China – Roots and Perspectives. Prague, 2011. 97.
28 From 1928 to 1947 the Republic of China went through a major legal reform based on the 
Western model. The “Six Laws or codes” refer to a Constitution, a civil and penal code, a civil 
procedural code, a penal procedural code and a law on the administration of justice.
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they never truly penetrated society.29 Though implementation was weak, the Nationalists’ 
legal efforts left their stamp on the People’s Republic of China, founded on 1 October 1949. 
Nevertheless, the Communist Party under Mao Zedong’s leadership took a different 
approach. Previous laws were considered bourgeois and therefore abolished. Without a 
comprehensive set of laws, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decisions gained legal status. 
Nevertheless, the Communist Party accepted, in the fi rst stage of socialism, the 
instrumentality of law as a way of achieving communism. A court system moulded on the 
German model was inherited, studied and implemented. It refl ected the country’s 
administrative geography: a basic level of courts at local/district level, an intermediate/ 
superior system of courts in each municipality and province, and a Supreme Court at central 
level.
Notwithstanding the existence of this court system, trials were often held in public, 
serving as public political/educational lectures. Cadres and activists with the right political 
attitudes were appointed within the court system.30 Strangely enough, the 1954 Constitution, 
the fi rst People’s Republic of China Constitution, stated that: “[i]n administering justice the 
people’s courts are independent and subject only to the law”.31 In his 1968 article, Professor 
Cohen, a leading expert on Chinese law, tried to give an interpretation and some explanation 
on why the principle was so clearly established in such a different political era–an era in 
which China lacked the political system necessary in Western eyes for an independent 
judiciary: above all the separation of powers doctrine. Even if Mao repressive policies 
during the 1950s were not that clear and strong,32 in light of what happened subsequently, 
the more plausible interpretation is that when the law is the will of the people and the Party 
and when article 78 of the 1954 Chinese Constitution states that People’s courts shall be 
subject only to the law, it means that the administration of law shall be subject to the Party 
as well. Further explanations can be based on the fact that the Party is the only body able to 
give an up-to-date interpretation of legal rules in accordance with the profound stratifi cation 
of the huge country and taking account of changing conditions.33
Such explanations soon put paid to the notion of the so-called “rightist movement”,34 
which was looking for greater professionalism as a way of enabling the judiciary to gain 
more independence from the Party. Nevertheless, courts were weak and, especially in 
serious criminal cases, judges referred cases to their local Party committee for open trials, 
where decisions were taken according to Party loyalty and policies more than in accordance 
with legal provisions.
In the main, the guiding role of the party and China’s democratic centralism tend to be 
two major pillars upon which the Chinese legal system has been built.
29 Ajani, G.–Timoteo, M.–Serafi no, A.: Diritto dell’Asia orientale (East Asian Law). Milano, 
2007. 183.
30 Lubman, S. B.: Bird in a Cage. Stanford, 1999. 48 and 73.
31 The 1954 Chinese Constitution is available at http://e-chaupak.net/database/chicon/1954/ 
1954ae.pdf, last accessed December 13, 2012.
32 The Hundred Flowers movement for example made some people think of a society more 
open to criticism.
33 Cohen, J. A.: The Chinese Communist Party and “Judicial Independence”: 1949–1959. 
Harvard Law Review, 82 (1968–1969), 967, 989.
34 The “Rightist movement” (1954–1957) represents a trend toward professionalism and against 
judicial erosion through Party control. For a closer examination of the topic see Cohen: op. cit. 989.
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The subsequent anti-rightist movement was in line with what happened during the 
Great (or Cultural) Revolution (1966–1976).35
Hostility to the judicial independence principle was so strong that all Chinese 
administrators and professors who had received their legal education within the Western-
style law school founded during the leadership of the Kuomintang were removed from 
offi ce in an attempt to stop universities talking of a judiciary independent of the Party. 
Cultural Revolution achievements are listed in the second Chinese Constitution of 1975. In 
it the judicial function is relegated to one single article which explicitly declares that:
“The Supreme People’s Court, local people’s courts at various levels and special 
people’s courts exercise judicial authority. The people’s courts are responsible and 
accountable to the people’s congresses and their permanent organs at the corresponding 
levels. The presidents of the people’s courts are appointed and subject to removal by 
the permanent organs of the people’s congresses at the corresponding levels. The 
functions and powers of procuratorial organs are exercised by the organs of public 
security at various levels. The mass line must be applied in procuratorial work and in 
trying cases. In major counter- revolutionary criminal cases the masses should be mo-
bilised for discussion and criticism.”36
The whole court system, almost entirely closed down during the Cultural Revolution,37 
was covered by just one article in the 1975 Constitution. The supremacy of the will of the 
people expressed through people’s congresses at central and local levels, as a corollary to 
democratic centralism and the leading role of the Party, was thus reaffi rmed. Soon after 
Mao’s death in 1976, the principle of judicial independence acquired a more cogent 
meaning. Within the articles of the 1978 Constitution the role of the courts was reinstated 
(Art. 41), though without any direct reference to their independence:
“The Supreme People’s Court, local people’s courts at various levels and special people’s 
courts exercise judicial authority. The people’s courts are formed as prescribed by law.
In accordance with law, the people’s courts apply the system whereby representatives 
of the masses participate as assessors in administering justice. With regard to major 
counter-revolutionary or criminal cases, the masses should be drawn in for discussion 
and suggestions. All cases in the people’s courts are heard in public except those 
involving special circumstances as prescribed by law. The accused has the right to 
defense.”38
35 The so-called Cultural Revolution was a 10-year campaign with the aim of establishing 
Communism. Law was to be removed, but also law schools and the Ministry of Justice. Labour 
rehabilitation was the tool for removing bourgeois and capitalistic disparities. See Lubman: op. cit. 80.
36 See http://www.leggicinesi.it/view_doc.asp?docID=586. Last accessed December 21, 2012.
37 For the purpose of this paper “closed down” means that law schools were closed in the literal 
sense of the word, as it was seen as the aim of Communist society aims to avoid the use of the law. 
Moreover, the urban-rural gap, i.e. the disparity in living standards between Chinese people living in 
the cities and those on the land, convinced Mao of the necessity to send professionals, especially law 
professors, out into the countryside. As a consequence, the judicial work of the courts was seriously 
impaired, in many cases making such institution have to close their doors.
38 The English translation of the 1978 Constitution is available at http://e-chaupak.net/database/
chicon/1978/1978e.pdf. Last accessed December 21, 2012.
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3. Judicial independence in the current Chinese Legal System
The principle of judicial independence was revived one year after the adoption of the 1978 
Constitution, being enshrined in the Organic Law on People’s Courts (1979). This set forth 
that people’s courts should conduct adjudication independently and should be subject only 
to the law .39
In the meantime the court system had been re-established after being closed down 
during the Cultural Revolution. Generally speaking, China reinstated its four-level system 
of “independent courts” in line with the country’s administrative set-up. At the top of the 
court hierarchy is the Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院 zuigao renmin fayuan) in 
Beijing, with offshoots at provincial level and in each of the four Chinese centrally-
governed metropolises and in the autonomous regions).40 Below the Supreme People’s 
Court come the Higher People’s Courts (高 级人民法院 gaoji renmin fayuan). The next 
lower level are the Intermediate People’s Courts (中级人民法院 zhongji renmin fayuan) 
found in rural towns and urban districts, while the lowest level is represented by the Basic 
People’s Courts (基层人民法院 jiceng renmin fayuan) at county level. In light of China’s 
huge size and the diffi culty to move from one part to another, a further option involves 
establishing People’s Tribunals (人民法庭 renmin fating). Their jurisdiction and the validity 
of their judgments are on a par with those of the Basic People’s Courts, meaning that any 
appeal is heard before an Intermediate People’s court.
The diagram below shows the hierarchy. Each court is generally internally divided into 
several divisions (庭 ting): the civil, criminal and administrative divisions.41 Moreover, 
there are several specialised courts such as the Maritime Court, the Railway Transportation 
Court, the Forest Affairs Court or the Military Court of the People’s Liberation Army.42
Not surprisingly there is no Constitutional Court in China, as assessing conformity 
with constitutional provisions is in the hands of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, the permanent legislative body. Considering the (very) close link 
between the Standing Committee (the controller) and the NPC (the controlled), such power 
has so far only been exercised very rarely.43
In 1982 a new Constitution was adopted, Article 126 of which refers to judicial 
independence, though in different terms:
39 Seong-hak, K. M.: A distant premise: Judicial Independence in the People’ Republic of 
China. Korean Journal of Comparative Law, 24 (1996), 17., 26.
40 The four Chinese metropolises directly under the central control are Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjing and Chongqing; the autonomous regions are: Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia, Xizang or Tibet, 
Guanxi Zhuang, Ningxia.
41 Recently many other divisions have been created within the courts of the richest and 
important Chinese metropolises. For instance the IPR division of the Supreme People’s Court is one 
of the most effi cient and popular.
42 Picture taken from http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.shtm, last accessed December 
21, 2012.
43 See article 67(1) of the actual Chinese Constitution available at http://www.lawinfochina.
com/display.aspx?id=3437&lib=law&SearchKeyword=constitution&SearchCKeyword=. Last acces-
sed December 21, 2012.
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“The people’s courts exercise judicial power independently, in accordance with the 
provisions of the law, and are not subject to interference by any administrative organ, 
public organization or individual”.44
44 Art 126 of the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
Supreme People’s Court
Original jurisdiction over cases that have been assigned to it by law,
or over cases that it decides it should try. It has jurisdiction over appeals
or protests from the higher people’s court and special people’s courts
Higher People’s Court
Jurisdiction in the first instance in cases assigned by law, or transferred
from lower courts, major criminal cases whith impact the entire province.
Courts also hear cases of appeals or protests against judgments and
orders of lower courts.
Intermediate People’s Court
First instance jurisdiction in some cases, including those transferred to it
from basic people’s court, major cases dealing with foreign parties;
counter-revolutionary cases, criminal cases subject to sentence of life
imprisonment or death; cases where foreigners committed crimes. 
Basic People’s Courts
Local level courts adjudicate criminal and civil cases of first instance.
Excluded from jurisdiction are criminal cases carrying penalty of death or
life imprisonment, as well as certain foreign civil cases. The courts can
request that more important cases be transferred to a higher court.
Maritime Court
Military Court 
of the PLA
Railway 
Transportation Court
Forest Affairs Court
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In comparison with the article in the 1979 Organic Law on People’s Courts, the scope 
of the article in the 1982 constitution was more moderate. Specifying that people’s courts 
were not subject to interference from any administrative organ, public organization or 
individual instead left room for interpretation and for such questions as whether the CCP 
could be considered a public organization? For the sake of consistency between the law and 
the Constitution, in 1983 the Standing Committee was quick to change the wording, with 
Article 4 of the Organic Law of People’s Courts becoming a copy of Article 126 of the 
Constitution.45
Notwithstanding the wording used in the Constitution and the law, the meaning given 
to judicial independence in China differed from the Western legal tradition. The fi rst point 
is that, literally speaking, the Constitution (and the Organic Law of People’s Courts as 
amended in 1983) speaks only of independence of the courts, without specifi cally referring 
to any independence of the individual judges. This circumstance has two roots.
First, from a political point of view, the independence of the whole court system is 
consistent with the democratic centralism view. Secondly, the lack of professionalism led to 
distrust in judges or, to be more precise, adjudicators. In fact, the Chinese characters used to 
refer to judges are the following: 审判员 shenpanyuan, which literally mean “offi cial of the 
decision”.
Despite the enactment of many Western-oriented laws and several changes in 
legislation, the court system remains neither independent nor completely trustworthy.
People’s congresses remain in charge of appointments at all levels. Combined reading 
of Article 11 of the Judges Law and Articles 62 (7), 63 (4), and 67 (11) of the Chinese 
Constitution reveals that the president of each court is chosen and removed by the people’s 
congress at the corresponding administrative level, whereas vice-presidents, members of 
the judicial committees, chief judges, associate chief judges of divisions and ordinary 
judges are appointed and removed by the standing committees of the people’s congresses at 
the corresponding levels upon the recommendation of the presidents of those courts. At 
central level the National People’s Congress (NPC) has the power to elect and remove the 
President of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), while the offi cials below him (see above) 
are appointed or removed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 
accordance with the SPC president’s recommendations. Not surprisingly, court presidents 
and higher ranking judges were for the most part Party members and, more often than not, 
the list of potential candidates was provided by the Party itself.46 On the other hand, the 
lack of professionalism allows external and internal factors to have a major infl uence. For 
instance, the SPC has to submit an annual report on its work to the NPC, with inferior 
courts compiling similar reports for the corresponding Local People’s Congress to which 
they are responsible. Probably, the strongest infl uence over courts is the supervision of their 
decisions by the respective people’s congresses (so-called legislative supervision).47 The 
lack of professionalism has also helped develop the role of the so-called judicial committees 
(or adjudicative committees, shenpanweiyuanhui 审判委员会). In accordance with Article 
45 Seong-hak, K. M.: op. cit. 17, 26. The Organic Law of People’s Courts is available at http://
www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=5623&lib=law&SearchKeyword=people’s%20
courts&SearchCKeyword=. Last accessed December 21, 2012.
46 Van Rooij, B.: Appendix II China’s System of Public Administration. In: Chen, J.–Li, Yuwen–
Otto, J. M. (ed): Implementation of Law in the People’s Republic of China. London, 2002. 323, 331.
47 Article 126 of the Constitution.
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11 of the Organic Law of People’s Courts, these are set up at all levels of people’s courts in 
application of democratic centralism to “sum up judicial experience and discuss important 
or diffi cult cases and other issues relating to judicial work”.48 Several reasons lead to this 
body being considered a threat for the judicial independence principle.
First, the committee, despite the wording of the legislation, decides cases without any 
close examination of the relevant facts. Secondly, it is made up of the court president, vice-
presidents, presidents of different divisions and the respective vice-presidents; if required, 
law professors and experts can also take part in the committee. As a consequence, the 
committee could be considered one of the more professionalised bodies within each court. 
However, its members seem to act and decide cases in the background and their names and 
legal reasoning are hardly ever traceable. Even greater fear and a sense of inadequacy is 
engendered by the annual (random) appraisal within each court. Again, professionalism and 
a well-established appointment system do not seem the major yardsticks to measure the 
independence of the judiciary (in contrast to the Western situation), with political loyalty 
again seeming to be the dominant factor. In the same way, long-term or life tenure is not 
apparently seen as a guarantee of independence. The Constitution does not provide any clue 
as far as judges’ tenure is concerned. Article 124 only states that “The term of offi ce of the 
President of the Supreme People’s Court is the same as that of the National People’s 
Congress. The President shall serve no more than two consecutive terms”, i.e. no more than 
10 years.
Even if the aforementioned mechanisms appear to be an obvious violation of judicial 
independence, they are prescribed by law and their effects have also been positive. The 
external supervision by the legislative organs and the internal control exercised by the 
judicial committees have often played a role in stopping or at least infl uencing illegal 
behaviour on the part of corrupt or unprofessional judges.
This brings me to the so-called non-systemic external infl uences such as local 
protectionism, corruption and 关系 guanxi. Local protectionism is amplifi ed in China due 
to the country’s deep stratifi cation and huge size.49 Guanxi is a typical Chinese word which 
means “relationship” and can result in a partial decision in favour of a friend or family 
members. Guanxi is a sometimes misleading term, as it can also be used to refer to a socio/
personal relationship involving a (perfectly legal) “exchange of favours”, especially 
between businessmen.50
 Such behaviour can also lead to corruption. The widespread judicial corruption in 
China is primarily due to a lack of protection, security of tenure and respect for the judiciary, 
especially in the poorer provinces in the west of the country. This is also due to the fact that 
during, but also after the Mao era, the “administrators of decisions” (i.e. judges), were often 
mere civil servants, lacking legal education (often retired Party cadres or retired soldiers). 
Moreover, the local administration controls not only the appointment and removal of 
48 See article 11 of the Organic Law of People’s Court (last amended 2006).
49 The fi rst book in English on this topic is Peerenboom, R. (ed.): Judicial Independence in 
China. Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion. Cambridge, 2010.
50 Ling, L.: Lost in Translation. “Rule of guanxi” an Alternative to the Rule of Law? In: 
Tomasek, M.–Muhlemann, G: Interpretation of Law in China–Roots and Perspectives. Prague, 2011. 
163–174.
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judges, but also their funding, with wages generally low or in line with those of civil 
servants.51
Finally, such a weak and controlled judiciary has often found itself unable to face up to 
public pressure exerted by the mass media.52 Instead of defending its decisions, it is liable 
to adapt them to take account of public opinion, thereby underlining its subservience. This 
is obviously no basis for Chinese courts to gain (international) recognition or respect as 
independent judicial institutions. 
The leading role of the Chinese Communist Party, affi rmed in the Preamble of the 
current Constitution, still creates uncertainty as far as its interference in the judiciary is 
concerned. In many cases, Party cadres are corrupt and behave out of personal interest, 
though at other times the Party intervenes to push through its policies where local 
protectionism or illegal conduct are out of line with national policies. With the Judges Act 
adopted in 1995, the “administrators of decisions” acquired an upgraded status and, overall, 
a minimum standard of professionalism became mandatory. In particular the law now 
referred to 法官 faguan and no longer to shenpanyuan, meaning that judges were no longer 
“administrators of decisions” but now “offi cials of the law”. The aim of the new Act was 
“to enhance the quality of judges, and to realize the scientifi c administration of judges”.53
Chapter IV if the Judges Act set forth minimum qualifi cations for judicial personnel to 
be appointed as judges.54
Even if a minimum standard of professionalism was prescribed, judges were treated 
within each court in the same way as civil servants. In accordance with Chapter VII of the 
Judges Act, judges are similarly divided into twelve grades.55 Generally speaking, those 
transferring in from non-legal positions would start at a rank commensurate with their 
seniority. Promotion up the ranks then occurred based on years worked and correct “political 
attitude”–to the evident detriment of any meritocratic system in favour of professional, 
honest, and competent judges.56 The courts thus have a strict inner hierarchy which is 
refl ected at each court level. There are twelve ranks of judges divided into four categories, 
each in turn consisting of different divisions needing to be passed through to reach the 
51 Hawes, C.: Improving the Quality of the Judiciary in China: Recent Reforms to the 
Procedures for Appointing, Promoting, and Discharging Judges. In: Russell, P. H.–Malleson, K.: 
Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspective from Around the World. Toronto, 
2006. 395–419, 413–414.
52 Liebman, B.: Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System. Columbia 
Law Review, 105 (2005), 1.
53 Article 1 of the Judges Act of the People’s Republic of China as originally adopted in 1995.
54 Article 9(6) Judges Act. Under it, a judge must:
“…have worked in law for at least two years in the case of graduates from a four-year course in the 
law specialty of an institution of higher education or a graduate from a four-year course in a non-law 
specialty of such an institution who possesses the professional knowledge of law, and to have worked 
in law for at least three years in the case of the said graduate to be appointed judge of Higher People’s 
Court or the Supreme People’s Court; to have worked in law for at least one year in the case of a 
person holding a Master of Law degree or Doctor of Law Degree; or a person holding a master’s 
degree or doctor’s degree of non-Law specialty who possesses the professional knowledge of law, and 
to have worked in law for at least two years in the case of the said person to be appointed judge of a 
Higher People’s Court or the Supreme People’s Court.”
55 Article 18 Judges Act.
56 Hawes, C.: Improving the Quality of the Judiciary in China: Recent Reforms to the 
Procedures for Appointing, Promoting, and Discharging Judges. In: Russell–Malleson: op. cit. 398.
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upper level. The four categories are: the ordinary judges (法官 faguan) at the bottom of the 
pyramid, the higher judges (高级法官 gaojifaguan), the grand judges (大法官 dafaguan) 
and fi nally the 首席大法官 shouxidafaguan or chief judge.
 
Interestingly, the composition of each court is not homogeneous, with the upper courts 
made up of judges picked from the higher ranks, while the basic courts are composed of 
lower judges. Generally speaking the higher the rank, the higher the professionalism should 
be, i.e. the degree of professionalism differs between the lower courts and tribunals and the 
upper courts.57
As a consequence, lower courts are usually keen to follow upper court recommendations 
and advice. In some parts of China it is still quite frequent for lower courts to ask upper 
courts how to deal with a legal matter, thereby undermining the appeal function.
All these are inevitable consequences of a socialist system ruled by democratic 
centralism, though the roots lie in China’s history as a centrally-run Empire. 
4. The inevitable judicial reform 
In the mid-1990s the need for a more sophisticated legal system able to deal with 
complicated issues was strongly perceived by Chinese leadership, especially as the country’s 
modernisation was apparently following the Western path and economic interests were 
57 The hierarchy is illustrated on a Chinese document (zhonghua renmin gongheguo faguan 
dengji zanxingguiding) issued on December 12, 1997 by the CCP, the Ministry of Human affairs and 
the Supreme People’s Court.
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involved. Legal reforms in line with the rule-of-law principles were required not only out of 
an expectation for more democratic policies, but also to allow the People’s Republic of 
China to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The country was quick to follow its international obligations and the tangible move 
resulted in the third Constitutional amendment in 1999, introducing into the Chinese context 
the “socialist rule of law” (法治 fazhi).58 This “constitutional promise”59 allowed on the one 
hand the admission of the PRC into the WTO, while on the other hand stimulating further 
legal and judicial reform.
In 1999 the Supreme People’s Court issued the fi rst fi ve-year judicial reform plan for 
the period 1999–2003. This document, as well as the following ones (the second program 
(2004–2008) and the third one (2009–2013)) is useful for understanding the weaknesses of 
the Chinese legal system.60
By and large, the focus of the reforms was much more on improving the professionalism 
and status of the judiciary than on changes in policy or the political relationship between 
the different state functions.
As a consequence of the fi rst plan, the Judges Act was amended for the purpose of 
introducing a national judicial examination (国家司法考试 guojiasifakaoshi) for all 
candidate judges. Article 12 of the amended Judges Act now stipulates:
“Persons to be appointed judges for the fi rst time shall be selected, through strict 
examination and appraisal, from among those who have passed the uniform national 
judicial examination and who are the best qualifi ed for the post, in conformity with the 
standards of having both ability and political integrity.”61
Moreover, as a way of facilitating more meritocratic career development, sub-section 2 
of the same article states that “Persons to be appointed presidents or vice-presidents of 
People’s Courts shall be selected from among the best judges and other people who are best 
qualifi ed for the post”.
In 2001 a code of conduct was issued by the SPC with the aim of stopping judges 
behaving unprofessionally, for instance meeting parties and lawyers outside the courtroom, 
behaving rudely or dressing improperly. The gravity and persistence of such behaviour led 
to the SPC compiling a new code of conduct which came into effect on June 2010.62 The 
Chinese judiciary needs to become more aware of its status and role within the society, 
even if such change will not take place overnight. 
58 Article 5 as amended in 1999 now establishes inter alia that “The People’s Republic of China 
governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country under the rule of law”.
59 Ajani, G.: La Rule of Law in Cina (The Rule of Law in China). In: Mondo Cinese, (2006) 
126, available at http://www.tuttocina.it/mondo_cinese/126/126_ajan.htm. Last accessed December 
21, 2012.
60 The fi rst two 5-year plans are available in Chinese at www.lawinfochina.com the third one in 
available also in English. Last accessed December 21, 2012.
61 Article 12 of the Judges Law available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=1861
&lib=law&SearchKeyword=judges&SearchCKeyword=. Last accessed December 21, 2012.
62 Code of Conduct for Judges, issued on 12/06/2010 available at  http://www.lawinfochina.
com/display.aspx?id=8609&lib=law&SearchKeyword=code%20of%20conduct%20for%20
judges&SearchCKeyword=. Last accessed December 21, 2012. 
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Other relevant reforms can be pointed to. Recently a joint Notice issued by the 
Organization Department for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and 
other institutions (among them the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate) established that no judge or prosecuting attorney who has not reached 
retirement age shall be forced to take early retirement and depart from the position.63
Such a conception of tenure appears to be seen more as a tool promoting the effi ciency 
of the system as a whole rather than as a guarantee of independence. Moreover, in 2011 the 
so-called “guiding case mechanism” was formally established to “unify the application of 
law, serve as guidance for the adjudicative work of lower courts, enrich and develop legal 
theory”.64
Several other reforms are currently being introduced to improve the judiciary’s 
professionalism, aimed at impartial decisions being achieved throughout the huge and 
stratifi ed country. These can hardly be discussed in just one paper.
III. Concluding remarks
Discourse on judicial independence in China started in the West, in expectancy of major 
political changes within the country. Though we have seen China changing some of its legal 
and economic rules, it has still managed to achieve its unprecedented economic growth 
without an independent court system and without a well-established system of property 
rights.
There can be no doubt that there is a certain inconsistency in China between “law on 
paper” and “law in action”. The PRC remains a one-Party state dominated by principles 
such as democratic centralism and the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party. 
Inevitably, the concept of judicial independence appears to be an oxymoron in such a 
country, but if the point of observation shifts from general considerations to more concrete 
situations, it is possible to argue that a certain degree of impartiality exists. Not surprisingly, 
this is found in cases which are not politically sensitive. Nevertheless, it does happen and is 
a circumstance which must be taken into account.
Such impartiality occurs in a context of lacking judicial independence, at least from a 
Western perception. For instance there is no specifi c legal provision providing judges with a 
guaranteed income and thus ensuring their dignity and making them less susceptible to 
corruption or public opinion. This important issue has however recently been considered, 
and the possibility of centralising court funding instead of leaving it up to local 
administrations has been discussed. Similarly, judges have no judicial review power to 
challenge Chinese legislation for breaching constitutional principles. A mere glance at the 
court structure diagram shows that the People’s Republic of China has no Constitutional 
Court. Judicial functioning is openly declared to be subordinate to the legislative even if the 
63 Notice of the Organization Department for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security Regarding effective Resolution of Early Departure from the Position and 
Resignation from the Job by the Judges and Prosecuting Attorney, promulgated 05/12/2010, available 
at www.westlawchina.com.
64 Gazette of the SPC, Issue 12, 2005 as quoted by Zhenbao, J.: Judicial Interpretation and the 
Envisaged Guiding Case Mechanism in Mainland China. In: Tomasek, M.–Muhlemann, G. (eds): op. 
cit. 143 s.
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Court system is supposed to be independent of all administrative organs, public 
organizations and individuals.
In other words, though the term independence leaves room for a variety of 
interpretations and questions, it would perhaps be better to focus on the fi nal aim, as pointed 
out by Keith Henderson, that ‘impartiality with the justice system is the fi nal goal’.65 
Looking therefore at decisional impartiality rather seeking an independent system of courts 
could be a better result-oriented approach. In the author’s view this would allow a better 
dialogue between central-local policies and legal culture. As was the case during the 
Empire, a study of Confucian textbooks proved the best guarantee for appointing worthy 
administrators through the imperial examination system. Similarly, a legal culture deserving 
its name would be the best guarantee for enhancing the administration of justice. The recent 
attention paid to judges’ professionalism appears to be in line with this aim. The recent 
political rhetoric does not seem to be shifting in the direction of Western-style judicial 
independent principles, instead requiring courts to follow the “three supremacies”: that of 
the CCP, that of the interests of the people, and that of the Constitution.66 Focusing on 
impartiality rather than on independence would allow a more pragmatic approach, 
immediately correcting such non-systemic problems as local protectionism, corruption, 
media infl uence, and guanxi.
As far as tenure is concerned, in the absence of any specifi c provision considering life 
tenure as an irrefutable guarantee for strengthening the status of the judiciary, the central 
government is continuing its search for a stable and more consistent legal system. It 
nevertheless realises that too much fl exibility and mobility, while in line with the fl exible 
solutions of the system itself, will not help boost people’s trust in the judiciary and promote 
a continuous, consistent, and rational development of the court system itself.
Nevertheless, impartial judges and impartial decisions are now needed to make the 
system reliable. The Chinese approach seems cautious, but over all in line with Chinese 
traditions.
For this reason, people in the West should, instead of waiting for political reforms 
(which for the time being appear to be out of the question), try to understand that “ritual lies 
in law and law in ritual”.67 A dialogue on judicial independence in the Western sense of the 
term is in my view impossible at the moment. It is probably much more useful to talk about 
professionalism among judges. In my view, intellectual professionalism could pave the way 
towards impartial justice and eventually, over time, lead to a different discourse.
65 Henderson: op. cit. 439.
66 Liebman, B.: China’s Courts: Restricted Reform. China Quarterly, (2007) 191, 620.
67 Szto, M.: op. cit. 29.
